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1. INTRODUCTION
On 9 June 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution for an open, efficient and 
independent European Union administration.2 In this resolution, Parliament calls the 
Commission to come forward with a legislative proposal, as well as to consider the annexed 
proposal made by Parliament.
In the preamble to the above resolution, Parliament pointed out that lacking coherent, 
codified rules of administrative procedure, citizens of the European Union are unable 
to understand and enforce their rights in procedures before EU bodies and authorities. 
Accordingly, Parliament adopted model rules on administrative procedure which shall 
apply together with provisions of EU law relating to specific administrative procedures. 
These model rules aim to implement the fundamental principles of procedural law set by 
different sources of EU law, including the case law of the Court of Justice.
Proposals, which had been made by experts before the present document was adopted, 
articulated the vision that European administrative law will necessarily lead to the 
Europeanisation of national administrative laws, so harmonisation of the terms of the 
two systems is to be expected, which can be realised primarily for the general principles 
governing administrative law. At conferences held during the period of preparatory 
research, a  concept gained ground that the content of general principles governing the 
administrative law of the Member States should be defined at the level of EU legislation. In 
my opinion, this approach is not worth supporting, as the scope of functioning of the EU 
administration differs significantly from the types of cases handled by the Member States’ 
administrative authorities. In the European Union, emphasis is placed on competition law, 
trademarks, consumer protection, public procurement law, state assistance and access to 
documents, while the national administrative bodies handle building law, social law mat-
ters and tax cases. Different fields of law demand obviously different views, even in relation 
to the content of general principles. That is why I decided to give an overall picture in my 
presentation of the contents given by the case law of the Curia of Hungary to the general 
principles acknowledged by EU administrative procedure law. For the sake of exactness, I 
am going to present the judgments interpreting general principles together with the facts 
of each case.
2. THE RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEEDING
In this case, which was completed by the judgment of the Curia in May 2015,3 the plain-
tiff’s previously-obtained waste-processing permit expired in 2009, without having been 
2 European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016 for an open, efficient and independent European Union 
administration (2016/2610[RSP]). Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-0279+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (Downloaded: 15.07.2017.)  
3 The Curia of Hungary, Case No. Kfv.III.37.162/2015/3.
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renewed. In 2010, as a result of supervision review, the regional environmental authority 
established and imposed fines both for illegal waste-processing and air pollution. The 
second-instance authority approved the findings of the first-instance decision and raised 
the amount of the fine.
The plaintiff filed an action against the second-instance decision, requesting its annula-
tion. The court of the first instance abolished the decision and ordered the second-instance 
authority to conduct a  new procedure, as it had not examined whether the plaintiff’s 
activity could qualify as a minor violation of law. In the aftermath, the second-instance 
authority instructed the first-instance authority to initiate new proceedings.
In the new proceedings, the first-instance authority imposed the same amount of fine, 
pointing out that the plaintiff’s activity was not to be considered as a minor violation of law, 
as an air-pollution fine had earlier been imposed. It indicated also the exact provisions of 
law serving as a basis for its decision. The second-instance authority approved the first-in-
stance decision.
The plaintiff filed an action against the new second-instance decision. He stated that the 
second-instance authority itself should have conducted the new proceedings, in accordance 
with the court order. He argued also that the fines had been imposed after the expiration 
of the statutory period of limitation, which resulted in the violation of his right to fair 
proceedings.
By its judgment, the administrative court abolished both decisions. It pointed out that 
even though the statutory period of limitation did not apply to repeated proceedings, the 
fact that no substantial measures were taken for 15 months was to be considered definitely 
as a violation of the right to fair proceedings.
The second-instance authority, as defendant, lodged a extraordinary appeal on points of 
law to the Curia, arguing that even in case of respecting the principle of fair proceeding, 
the same decision would have been made, and thus its violation did not have any effect on 
the merits of the case.
The Curia established, with reference to its earlier uniformity decision, that violation of 
procedural law may also lead to abolishment, if it is substantial, i.e. it affects the merits of 
the case and cannot be remedied by the court. In this respect, the right to fair proceeding 
is a principle that serves as an auxiliary for the interpretation of specific legal norms and 
forms only exceptionally a direct cause of action. In this latter case, although there is no 
relation of cause and effect between the violation of a procedural norm and the merits of 
the case, the enforceability of the party’s rights has been curtailed to such an extent that 
it qualifies as a substantial violation of procedural law. In the present case, the statutory 
deadline bound the authority in an ex officio procedure, but did not create rights for the 
party. Accordingly, a decision made after the expiration of a statutory deadline does not 
lead to substantial and direct violation of the party’s rights, especially in case of imposing 
fines.
Considering the above, the Curia accepted the defendant’s claim and abolished the deci-
sion of the administrative court, on the basis that it had wrongly referred to the violation 
of the right to fair proceeding.
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3. LAWFUL JUDICIAL DISCRETION
In the following case, closed by the judgment of the Curia in April 2016,4 the consumer 
protection authority imposed a fine on an electric power supplier, as it had stopped the 
supply of power, though the consumer had made an overpayment and had not actually been 
notified on bills due for payment. The supplier argued that it had notified the consumer 
by mail which had been returned as ‘unclaimed’. The first-instance authority pointed out 
that the supplier’s violation of law had concerned the consumer’s fundamental rights. The 
supplier appealed against the decision, but the second-instance authority increased the 
amount of fine, explaining that the supplier stopped the supply of power within 60 days 
counting from the due date and violated the consumer’s right to information, by failure 
to notify her in the first reminder on the discounts available for socially disadvantaged 
consumers.
The power supplier filed an action against the second-instance decision, requesting the 
abolishment thereof and a reduction of fine. It represented that it had abided by the statu-
tory deadline and had stopped the supply of power after 60 days. The supplier disputed also 
the authority’s exercise of discretion, as it had failed to consider all the relevant facts when 
imposing the fine.
The administrative court basically accepted the plaintiff’s arguments and altered the 
second-instance decision by decreasing the amount of fine. The court established that the 
supplier met the statutory deadline, but failed to comply with the lawful duty to inform 
the consumer on the available discounts and the possibility to register as a ‘consumer to be 
protected’. Considering all circumstances of the case, the court found that the authority 
had exercised its discretion inconsistently and, as the facts to be considered had duly 
been revealed, remedied the violation of law by decreasing the amount of the fine. The 
court considered the small number of the consumers concerned (only one) and the lack 
of any advantage on the plaintiff’s side arising from the violation of law as mitigating 
circumstances.
The second-instance authority, as defendant, filed an extraordinary appeal on points of 
law to the Curia, explaining that it had considered all the relevant circumstances and both 
the first and second-instance decisions detailed the reasons serving as a basis for exercising 
its discretionary power.
The Curia allowed the defendant’s appeal, underlining that decisions on fines made at the 
discretion of an administrative authority may be subject to judicial reconsideration only in 
case of express violation of law. Otherwise, reconsideration of facts and circumstances, once 
evaluated by the authority, is not allowed. The consumer protection authority imposed the 
fine with respect to the relevant legal provisions and gave a detailed reasoning from which 
the aspects of consideration are identifiable. The administrative court, however, drew 
incorrect conclusions from the relevant legal provisions, because instead of establishing 
4 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kf.III.37.083/2016/4.
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the violation of a specific legal norm, it judged only that the fine had been exaggerated. In 
addition, circumstances considered by the administrative court as mitigating ones were 
partially evaluated by the authority earlier, partially unable to qualify as mitigating (e.g. 
fulfilling obligations set by law, or the lack of any advantage arising from a violation of law). 
The Curia also pointed out that in administrative cases, judicial review is restricted to the 
points of law, so only unlawful administrative acts can be abolished or altered.
In accordance with the above reasoning, the Curia abolished the administrative court’s 
decision and rejected the plaintiff’s claim.
4. NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE
The next case was ruled by the Curia in May 2010.5 Fines were imposed on two Hungarian 
online media providers for advertising foreign gambling companies on their websites.
Both media providers filed an action against the administrative decision, representing 
that the freedom to provide services applied also to Gibraltar pursuant to the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, and they had been providing their services within the 
territory of the European Union. The plaintiffs referred to the primacy of European Union 
law and the direct effect of the Treaty, and pointed out also that prohibition of adver-
tising service providers settled in the Community qualifies as restriction of the freedom 
to provide services and, as such, must fulfil the requirements of necessity and suitability 
in accordance with the test implemented by the European Court of Justice. According 
to their standpoint, the measure taken by the Hungarian authority did not meet these 
requirements, as it was obviously discriminatory.
The court of the first instance decided in favour of the plaintiffs, underlining that pur-
suant to Article 49 of the Treaty of Rome, the defendant should have ignored the discrimi-
natory provision of national law, as it was contrary to Community law.
The defendant filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law to the Curia, requesting 
the abolishment of the first instance decision. The authority argued that the aim of the 
administrative procedure was not to restrict the provision of services, but to decide the 
question whether the advertising activities were in accordance with national provisions of 
law. It added also that fines were imposed in relation to the advertisements published on 
the websites operated by the media providers (and not by the gambling companies). The 
defendant represented furthermore that one of the online gambling companies is based 
outside the European Community.
The Curia refused the defendant’s appeal. It accepted the legal arguments presented 
by the court of first instance, according to which the respective provision of the Act on 
Business Advertising violates the non-discrimination rule, as it prohibits only advertise-
ments related to gambling games organised abroad, while it does not imply any prohibition 
5 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kfv.IV.37.757/2009/6.
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related to gambling games organised in Hungary. The Curia referred also to ECJ case law, 
underlining that the prohibition in question realises a restriction of the freedom to provide 
services, as it affects the services provided by the gambling companies and it is suitable for 
restricting them directly and actually. In addition, the Curia underlined that the provision 
of services may be subject to restrictions by Member States for public-order, public-se-
curity, public-health purposes. Nevertheless, even these restrictions should abide by the 
non-discrimination rule.
As to the defendant’s statement concerning the head office of one gambling company, 
the Curia referred to its own case law, confirming that new circumstances which were not 
subject of earlier proceedings cannot be referred to in the revision procedure before the 
Curia.
5. EQUAL TREATMENT
A very interesting case was ruled by the Curia in October 2016,6 where the grand hall of 
a restaurant was used in the evening hours by a circle of friends, organised by a natural 
person who made a table reservation. The plaintiff entered the restaurant that evening and 
wanted to sit in the grand hall. The manager of the restaurant, knowing that there was bad 
blood between the plaintiff and the organiser of the company at table, provided catering 
services for him in another hall. Therefore, the plaintiff made a complaint to the consumer 
protection authority for violation of equal treatment, which was then refused by both the 
first and second instance authorities.
The plaintiff filed an action against the administrative decision, arguing that there was 
no private event in the restaurant at that night, so he should have been served in the hall 
in which he demanded.
The administrative court refused the plaintiff’s action and accepted the authority’s legal 
arguments, according to which disputes of a personal nature do not fall within its compe-
tence and even if provisions of the Act on Equal Treatment applied to the organiser, the 
restaurant manager’s conduct would qualify as reasonable, and not as a violation of equal 
treatment.
The plaintiff filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law to the Curia, explaining 
that the defendant failed to fulfil its duty to reveal the facts of the case, and requested the 
abolishment of the judgment and the administrative decisions equally.
The Curia, however, rejected the plaintiff’s appeal, underlining that it is considered in 
particular as violation of equal treatment, if the provision of services or the sale of goods 
is denied or neglected by reason of a certain characteristic set by law, or if labels or signs 
are put indicating that certain individuals are excluded from the provision of services or 
the sale of goods. It was clear that the manager had not denied or neglected the provision 
6 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kfv. III.37.519/2016/6.
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of services in the restaurant, and that was neither disputed by the plaintiff. As the plaintiff 
agreed to be served in another hall and no findings were recorded about any negative 
consequences to be applied by the manager in case the plaintiff would not accept his offer, 
the acceptance itself excludes any violation of equal treatment.
6. PROPORTIONALITY
The next case, ruled by the Curia in February 2014,7 has EU-law relevance. The defendant 
administrative authority rejected a  company’s application for state aid available for 
micro-enterprises within the framework of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). The authority argued that the plaintiff, when procuring means 
necessary for his project, gamed the application conditions artificially to double the 
amount of the aid.
The plaintiff filed an action against the administrative decision, but the court of first 
instance rejected his claim and rejected also his attempt to initiate proceedings before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Constitutional Court of Hungary, deeming those 
unnecessary. The plaintiff then filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law to the Curia, 
stating that the court of first instance ignored the EU-law aspects of the case without due 
reason, and that the judgment thus violated the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.
The Curia allowed the plaintiff’s petition, abolished the judgment and ordered the court 
of the first instance to rehear the case. In the reasoning part, the Curia underlined that 
EAFRD aid is paid from the EU budget, consequently the authorities of the Member States 
bear great responsibility to prevent any illegal transaction. In this respect, the Member 
States are also entitled to adopt implementation rules to protect the efficient use of EU 
funds. The Curia accepted the legal arguments of the court that the parallel nature of 
the relevant provisions of EU law and national law excludes any conflict between them. 
In accordance with the Fundamental Law of Hungary, such conflicts can be settled by 
ignoring provisions of national law, so it is not necessary to launch any proceeding before 
the ECJ or the Constitutional Court.
As one of the plaintiff’s arguments was that the provisions of the respective EC Regu-
lation enacting sanctions violate the principle of proportionality, and thus the invalidity 
thereof shall be established by the ECJ as a result of a preliminary ruling procedure, the 
Curia recalled the proportionality test developed by the ECJ, which makes any reference 
to preliminary ruling unnecessary. According to this test, the measure must be necessary 
and suitable to achieve a legitimate aim. The test implies also the legislator’s obligation to 
choose the less restrictive measure, if available, so any disadvantage caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aim pursued. The restriction set by the respective EC Regulation 
7 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kfv.IV.35.166/2013/8.
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aims to prevent any misuse of the funds of the EU and its Member States. This is a legit-
imate aim, and the legal measures pursuing it are necessary and cannot be considered as 
disproportionate.
Nevertheless, as the facts of the present case had not been fully revealed, the Curia had 
to abolish the judgment.
7. IMPARTIALITY
In September 2016, the Curia ruled a  construction law case8 where the principle of 
impartiality was the subject matter of revision. The plaintiffs were obliged by the first-in-
stance authority to remove 3 advertising panels and 13 posters from a location which was 
their property. The authority argued that the panels and the posters did not fit into the 
townscape, and referred to the provisions of municipal regulations on advertising and 
townscape protection.
The plaintiffs filed an action against the administrative act, but the administrative court 
rejected their claim by reason of unsuccessful taking of evidence, as the photos taken in 
the course of the administrative procedure duly supported the lawfulness of the decision. 
In their extraordinary appeal on points of law submitted to the Curia, the plaintiffs 
represented that the administrative decision actually ordered them to demolish a  stone 
boundary wall while the court established the facts of the case contrary to the files, as 
the property concerned does not belong to the zone covered by the relevant municipal 
regulation. Finally, they raised an objection that the second instance decision was made by 
persons who had taken an active part in making the decision of the first instance.
The Curia, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal. It underlined that every person has 
the right to have his or her affairs handled fairly, which implies the right to an impartial 
procedure. Consequently, there must be an impartial body in every appeal case. Another 
important guarantee is that persons who took part in making the first-instance decision 
are excluded from the second-instance proceedings. The second-instance body cannot be 
considered as impartial, if the persons who took part in the first-instance procedure take 
part in making the second-instance decision. Accordingly, the application and the appeal 
cannot be handled by the same person in the same capacity, and it must be indicated in the 
decision itself which body or organ has made the decision.
The Curia referred also to its earlier case law, according to which the delegation of a com-
petence to a specific unit of the administrative authority is allowed, yet does not affect the 
personal responsibility of the original addressee of that competence. The administrative 
act is lawful if it was issued by a person who was entitled by the internal rules of procedure 
to proceed on behalf of the original addressee of the competence, and these circumstances 
are clearly proved in the decision. In the present case, it was evident from the documents 
8 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kfv.IV.37.984/2015/4.
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that the first-instance decision had been issued by a department leader who acted on behalf 
of the mayor, and then the second-instance decision was issued by the mayor himself who 
was entitled to represent and act on behalf of the body of municipal representatives. Con-
sequently, the principle of impartiality has not been violated.
For the sake of completeness, the Curia accepted the administrative court’s arguments 
on the points of substantial law, confirming that the plaintiffs’ property was subject to the 
municipal regulation on advertising.
8. LAWFUL EXPECTATIONS
The next case concerned local taxation.9 In June 2015, the plaintiff company obtained 
sites in an industrial park. According to the municipal regulation on local taxes in force, 
properties located within the territory of the industrial park were exempt from real-estate 
tax for a  period of three years dated from the acquisition. Accordingly, the municipal 
tax authority established the property tax at 0 HUF for the year 2015. After that, a new 
regulation on local taxes was adopted, which enacted ‘tax districts’ in the municipality 
area, including also the industrial park. Pursuant to the provisions of this new regulation, 
the company was obliged to pay a property tax of HUF 1,575 million per property for the 
year 2016.
The plaintiff filed an action against the decision of the municipal tax authority, arguing 
that the regulation enacted a confiscation tax and did not provide due time to prepare for 
the application of the new legal provisions. The administrative court stayed the proceedings 
and referred the case to the Municipality Panel of the Curia which is entitled to examine 
the compliance of municipal regulations reliant on higher-level provisions of law (except 
the Fundamental Law). The administrative court pointed out that the new municipality 
regulation was adopted on 30 November 2015 and entered into force as of 1 January 2016, 
so no due preparation time was given.
The Curia accepted the arguments presented by the administrative court, underlining 
that the plaintiff expected on good grounds that he would be exempted from property 
tax until 2018. Consequently, the Curia had to examine whether the modification of 
local taxation provisions affected lawful expectations. In Hungary, legislative ‘promises’ 
can be withdrawn only in conformity with the principle of legal certainty. According to 
the case law of the Constitutional Court, a  tax discount already obtained for a  definite 
period implies a lawful expectation following from the legislator’s promise, so decreasing 
or withdrawing them before the expiration of the definite period violates legal certainty. 
It is important to distinguish between short-term and long-term tax discounts. In case of 
short-term discounts, legal certainty is a clear barrier to any decrease or withdrawal, while 
in case of long-term discounts, opportunity shall be given to the legislator to decrease or 
9 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Köf.5036/2016.
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even withdraw the discounts in case of fundamental changes in circumstances given at 
the time of providing the discounts. A tax exemption for a period of five years was to be 
considered by the Constitutional Court as a short-term discount.
In the present case, the municipality abolished the tax exemption by providing a prepa-
ration time of one month only, although the plaintiff trusted on lawful grounds that he 
would remain exempt from taxation until the expiration of the given period, so he had 
a lawful expectation.
Besides the above, the Curia examined and accepted the plaintiff’s argument concerning 
the discriminatory nature of the new regulation. The Curia established that in the ‘indus-
trial park’ district, only the plaintiff’s properties were subject to taxation, so the abstract 
legal norm applies to one taxpayer, and that qualifies as negative discrimination. As a result, 
the Curia abolished the municipality regulation with a retroactive effect to 1 January 2016.
9. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The next case10 involves a  municipality regulation again which was abolished by the 
Municipality Panel of the Curia. The procedure falls within the exclusive competence of 
the Curia and can be initiated also by the Government Office of the county concerned. The 
Office initiated proceedings against a municipal regulation about social-aid payments. The 
Curia partially allowed the petition, for the following reasons.
In Hungary, a  specific type of social aid or benefit can be granted to inactive young 
people and their families. This benefit is subject to terms and conditions set partially by the 
Social Assistance Act, partially by the municipality regulation adopted by authorisation 
of the former Act. The municipality can define, as a condition of granting, the applicant’s 
obligation to maintain the habitat (apartment, house, garden, pavement) etc. in a good and 
hygienic condition.
The municipality regulation in question prescribed the verification of lawful use of the 
property in which the applicant lives by indicating the specific legal title. Nevertheless, the 
regulation did not define what should be understood under the term ‘lawful use’, neither 
did it regulate how the lawful use should be verified. The regulation set a  specific term 
in case for applicants living in newly built apartments: social aid was subject to a valid 
certificate of usability or a valid operation permit (the latter in case of illegal construction), 
as well as to due lighting, ventilation and heating facilities. These are specific rules of con-
struction law and the municipality had no authorisation to set such rules as a condition of 
granting social aid. Consequently, the Curia abolished them.
The applicant also had to make declarations in respect of the property, e.g. to make 
lawful use of public utility services, to pay all the utility bills no later than two months 
after due date, to install waste bins etc. By prescribing these rules, the municipality had not 
10 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Köf.I.5.051/2012/6.
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gone beyond its authorisation given by the Social Assistance Act, so the Curia refused to 
abolish these provisions.
Besides the above, the municipality regulation included a  long sentence stipulating 
the exclusion of all circumstances from the property which would jeopardise the child’s 
socio-cultural environment and would be harmful to the development of his or her per-
sonality. The Curia confirmed that the protection of future generations has been given high 
priority by the Hungarian legislation, but the sentence in question was hardly understand-
able, so this provision violated the legislator’s obligation to adopt clear and understandable 
legal norms.
The regulation prescribed also that neither industrial nor business activities are allowed 
on the properties concerned, and it is forbidden to keep materials, instruments or animals 
which fully occupy at least one room in the property. The Curia pointed out that these 
provisions, restricting the freedom of enterprise, cannot be deduced from the authorising 
provisions of the Social Assistance Act, as there is only a weak relationship between the 
obligation to maintain the property in good condition and the storage of goods or livestock.
The Government Office in charge referred also to the municipality going beyond its 
authorisation by stipulating that the applicant and all other persons living in the property 
should care for their own personal hygiene. The Curia established first that this provision 
applied not only to the applicant but to other persons as well, thus it violated the Social Assis-
tance Act. In addition, this provision affects privacy as well, which is protected by Article 
8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Pursuant to resolution No. 428/1970 of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, this right implies the integrity of 
and minimum interference with every person’s private life. Personal hygiene and clothing 
are covered by terms protecting privacy, as being closely connected to physical integrity. 
According to the case law of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, personal autonomy has 
a core which neither the state nor other persons can interfere with, and which can only 
exceptionally be subject to legislation. Prescribing the maintenance of personal hygiene is 
irrelevant to the granting of social aid payments, and counts also as a violation of privacy. 
Accordingly, the Curia abolished the provision in question.
10. LOSS OF OBTAINED RIGHTS
In this case, finished in March 2014,11 the Curia had to decide whether a  bricked-up 
doorway could lawfully be reopened. The plaintiffs filed an action against the decision of 
the construction authority ordering them to brick up the doorway, as it had been erected 
without construction permit and in violation of rules of construction.
The court of the first instance abolished the decision of the defendant authority, 
accepting the plaintiff’s argument that the doorway had existed already in 1969, before 
11 The Curia of Hungary, case No. Kfv.II.37.064/2014/4.
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the neighbouring site was divided from their property, so construction provisions in force 
do not apply to it. The court also agreed with their argument that the reopening of the 
doorway did not affect any element of structure, so it was not subject to permission. The 
defendant authority filed a extraordinary appeal on points of law to the Curia, explaining 
that by bricking up the doorway decades ago, the plaintiff lost their right to use it, so the 
reopening of same could be allowed only in accordance with the legal provisions in force, 
in particular those relating to the distance between buildings.
The Curia allowed the defendant’s appeal, pointing out that the court of the first instance 
drew incorrect legal consequences from the matters of fact. The doorway had been bricked 
up for decades, until it was reopened in 2011. Accordingly, the plaintiffs had to abide by 
the legal provisions which were in force in that year. Namely, even in case of construction 
activities which can be pursued without permission or notification, the construction 
authority shall examine whether the activity in question complies with the relevant legal 
norms. The Curia underlined that by bricking up the doorway, the plaintiffs lost their right 
to it, so the fact that it had been existed before the neighbouring house was erected has no 
relevance, and neither has the fact that anyone had knowledge about the earlier situation. 
And in the absence of any obtained rights, the construction authority had to order the 
elimination of that building part, as it violated the provisions concerning the minimum 
distance between buildings.
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proceeding in civil law and administrative law cases. He became judge of the Supreme 
Court in 2000, and was appointed President of the Curia of Hungary with effect from 
1 January 2012.
Besides his positions as judge and president, he is Assistant Professor at the Financial 
Law Department of the Faculty of Law at Eötvös Loránd University. He is president 
of the Hungarian Division of International Federation of European Law (FIDE). He 
is director of the specialist training programme in real-estate law at the Deák Ferenc 
Institute of Pázmány Péter Catholic University. His main fields of interest are admin-
istrative and tax jurisdiction, administrative procedure law, environmental law and 
real-estate law.
